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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
ING USA ANNUITY AND LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY and ING 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC. and )( 
DAMIAN BERRY, )( 
Defendants. 
)( 
)( 
AUG 11 2010 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY, GA 
Civil Action No. 2007CV134590 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE PORTIONS OF 
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF ANDREW MILLER 
On June 24, 2010, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral 
argument on Plaintiffs' motion to exclude certain portions of testimony by 
Defendants' expert witness, Dr. Andrew Miller. After reviewing the briefs 
submitted on the motions, Dr. Miller's expert report, the record in the case, and 
the arguments presented by counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
Defendant J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. ("JPMSI") provided investment 
banking services to an Australian mining company named Sons of Gwalia 
Limited ("Gwalia"). Defendant Damian Berry ("Berry") was an employee of 
JPMSI between 1998 and 2002 and was JPMSl's relationship mC!nager for 
Gwalia during that time. Starting in 2000, Gwalia decided to raise capital through 
the private placement of debt securities. This private placement strategy 
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occurred over the course of two offerings-the first in the fall of 2000 ("2000 
Private Placement") and the second in early 2002 ("2002 Private Placement"). 
Plaintiffs lNG-USA Annuity and Life Insurance ("lNG-USA") and ING Investment 
Management LLC ("lNG-1M") participated in the 2002 Private Placement. ING-
USA, a life insurance company, ultimately purchased $32 million of the notes 
offered by Gwalia in the 2002 Private Placement. JPMSI acted as Gwalia's 
broker for both the 2000 Private Placement and the 2002 Private Placement and, 
among other things, assisted Gwalia in preparing a private placement 
memorandum for each offering. In 2004, Gwalia entered into voluntary 
administration which is the Australian equivalent of bankruptcy. 
Plaintiffs allege that during the 2002 Private Placement, Defendants 
misrepresented and concealed Gwalia's true financial picture. In particular, 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants misrepresented and concealed: (1) Gwalia's 
investments in derivatives called Indexed Gold Put Options ("IGPOs"), (2) 
Gwalia's liquidity crisis following an unauthorized trading spree by Gwalia's 
director of finance, and (3) problems with Gwalia's acquisition of another gold 
mining company, Pacific Mining Corporation Limited ("Pac Min"). Based on 
these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of the Georgia Securities 
Act of 1973 ("GSA"), common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
violations of the Georgia RICO Act. Plaintiffs have moved to exclude certain 
portions of the testimony of Defendants' expert Dr. Andrew Miller. 
In 2005, the Georgia General Assembly adopted O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1, 
which requires a trial court to apply the federal Daubert rule in assessing the 
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admissibility of expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993). Therefore, federal authority, as well as Georgia law, is 
relevant to the question of admissibility. Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 
271, 279 (2008) (holding that it is "proper to consider and give weight to 
constructions placed on the federal rules by federal courts when applying or 
construing" O.C.G.A. § 24-7-67.1 because the Georgia statute was based upon 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert). Pursuant to both O.C.G.A. § 24-9-
67.1 and Daubert, once a court determines that "scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact," an expert may give opinion 
testimony so long as such testimony is reliable and relevant. O.C.G.A. §24-9-
67.1; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-595 (1993). O.C.G.A § 24-9-67.1 defines reliable 
and relevant testimony as testimony that is based upon sufficient facts or data, is 
the product of reliable methods, and is the product of a reliable application of the 
methods to the facts of the case. 
The Daubert standard is liberal and favors admissibility. See, M..,., KSP 
Investments, Inc. v. U.S., 2008 WL 182260 (N.D. OH 2008) ("As commentators 
have noted, Rule 702 evinces a liberal approach regarding admissibility of expert 
testimony. Under this liberal approach, expert testimony is presumptively 
admissible."); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 530 (2008) 
("[R]ejection of expert testimony is the exception, rather than the rule."). In a 
Daubert inquiry, the trial court acts as a "gatekeeper" in determining whether the 
expert is qualified to testify. See, M..,., CSX Transp., Inc. v. McDowell, 294 Ga. 
App. 871, 872 (2008). 
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Defendants' expert Dr. Andrew Miller. Dr. Miller is, among other things, an 
adjunct professor of economics at NYU and a principal at Chicago Partners 
where he provides consulting services to attorneys and companies on financial 
and economic matters. Dr. Miller was retained by Defendants to give expert 
testimony on complex issues underlying this case, namely: hedging, derivatives, 
loss causation, damages, and related economic issues. Plaintiffs do not contest 
Dr. Miller's general qualifications to serve as an expert witness. Based on his 
background and experience, the Court finds that Dr. Miller possesses proper 
qualifications to allow him to serve as an expert witness on the topics listed 
above. 
In an effort to exclude certain portions of Dr. Miller's testimony, Plaintiffs 
argue that he has offered testimony on three topics for which he is not qualified 
to testify: (1) whether the relevant securities offering document authored by 
Defendants included misrepresentations or omissions, (2) the materiality of the 
alleged misrepresentations and omissions, and (3) the adequacy of Plaintiffs' due 
diligence in their evaluation the investment at issue. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
accuse Dr. Miller of giving a "stealth" analysis of disclosure and materiality in 
paragraph 112 of his Initial Report. The Court disagrees. The Court finds that 
paragraph 112 is a part of Dr. Miller's damages analysis in which he reviews the 
omissions alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint and provides his assessment of the 
relevance of those alleged omissions to the 2002 Notes interest rate. Plaintiffs 
argue that this relevance analysis is in reality a disguise through which Dr. Miller 
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offers an opinion on materiality-the importance a reasonable person would 
attach to a particular fact in determining his or her course of action in a particular 
transaction. However, the Court finds that Dr. Miller is not offering a materiality 
opinion and that he may be permitted to testify to his analysis in paragraph 112 
of his Initial Report as a part of his analysis of damages in this case. Likewise, 
the Court finds that Dr. Miller may testify to his analysis in paragraphs 113-116 
as it goes to his damages opinions. 
Plaintiffs conclude their argument by asserting that Dr. Miller has engaged 
in speculation rather than employing any methodology at all in conducting part of 
his damages analysis. The Court disagrees and finds that in the sections of Dr. 
Miller's report with which Plaintiffs take issue, Dr. Miller has offered a 
comprehensive and reasoned expert opinion on damages in this case. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of the Expert 
Testimony of Andrew Miller is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this 11th day of August 2010. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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